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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
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V.

MEGAN DIANE KELLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 47526-2019 & 47529-2019
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR-FE-2013-13422
& CR0l-19-33930
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Megan Diane Keller pleaded guilty to felony possession of
a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three
years fixed, retained jurisdiction, and subsequently placed Ms. Keller on probation for a period
of seven years.

During that period of probation, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Keller

pleaded guilty in a second case to felony possession of a controlled substance. She also admitted
to violating her probation in the first case. In the first case, the district court revoked probation
and executed the underlying sentence. In the second case, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to run concurrently with the sentence in the
first case.
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On appeal, Ms. Keller asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
probation and executed her underlying sentence in the first case, and when it imposed her
sentence in the second case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
An Ada County Sheriffs Office Deputy conducted a traffic stop on a car for having an
unregistered license plate, and Ms. Keller was one of the passengers in the car. (See No. 47526
Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Ms. Keller told the officer she had marijuana and a
marijuana pipe in her purse, and denied knowledge of any other illegal items in the car. (See
PSI, p.3.) Officers found the marijuana and the pipe, as well as two pill bottles, one of which
had Ms. Keller's name on it. (See PSI, p.3.) Officers determined two of the types of pills found
in the bottle with Ms. Keller's name on it were amphetamine salt and methylphenidate. (See
PSI, p.3.)
In Ada County No. CR-FE-2013-13422 (hereinafter, the 2013 case), the State charged
Ms. Keller with two counts of felony possession of a controlled substance, one count of
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and one count of misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia. (No. 47526 R., pp.53-54.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Keller agreed
to plead guilty to one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining counts. (See No. 47526 R., pp.60-69, 73.) Ms. Keller would also
participate in drug court under the plea agreement. (See No. 47526 R., p.73.) The district court
accepted Ms. Keller's guilty plea. (See No. 47526 R., p.73.) She later admitted to violating her
drug court agreement, and agreed to discharge from the program. (See No. 47526 R., pp.85-87,
108-09.) The district court subsequently imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (No. 47526 R., pp.112-16.)
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After Ms. Keller participated in a "rider," the district court suspended her sentence and
placed her on supervised probation for a period of seven years. (No. 47526 R., pp.127-33.) As a
condition of probation, the district court required her to participate in drug court. (See No. 47526
R., pp.126, 134, 254.) Ms. Keller successfully completed drug court, and the district court
granted her motion to be placed on unsupervised probation. (No. 47526 R., pp.158-62.)
Over three years into Ms. Keller's period of probation, the State filed a Motion for Bench
Warrant for Probation Violation, alleging she had violated her probation. (No. 47526 R., pp.16365.)

Ms. Keller admitted to amended allegations that she had violated her probation by

committing the new crime of misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of drugs, and using a controlled substance without a prescription. (See No. 47526 R., pp.17983.) The district court reinstated Ms. Keller on supervised probation for the original period of
seven years. (No. 47526 R., pp.185-86, 188-95.) The district court also added special conditions
of probation, removing the requirement that she complete drug court, while requiring her to
obtain a GAIN evaluation and comply with all recommended treatment, serve 90 days in jail, and
complete the jail substance abuse program. (No. 47526 R., pp.185, 188-89.) If she successfully
completed the substance abuse program, she could apply for early release.

(No. 47526

R., p.189.)
Ms. Keller successfully completed the substance abuse program, and the district court
granted her motion for early release. (No. 47526 R., pp.196-203.) About four months after the
district court ordered Ms. Keller's release from custody, the State filed a Motion for Probation
Violation (Agents Warrant), alleging she had violated her probation. (No. 47526 R., pp.219-20.)
Following a traffic stop on her vehicle for stopping beyond a stop line and driving with a
suspended license, Ms. Keller had allegedly admitted to Boise Police Department officers that
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she had bought heroin and told them where it was in the vehicle. (See No. 47526 R., pp.221-22;
PSI, p.332.) The officers placed her under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (See No. 47526 R., pp.221-22.) The State also alleged that
Ms. Keller had admitted to heroin use on a separate occasion. (See No. 47526 R., p.222.)
Meanwhile, in Ada County No. CR0l-19-33930 (hereinafter, the 2019 case), the State
charged Ms. Keller with felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. (No. 47529 R., pp.6-7, 25-26; see No. 47526 R., pp.223-25.)
In the 2013 case, Ms. Keller admitted to violating her probation by committing the new
crime of felony possession of a controlled substance, as charged in the 2019 case. (See No.
47526 R., pp.220, 242-43, 255.) In the 2019 case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Keller
agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. (See No. 47529 R., pp.2728-39.) The district court accepted Ms. Keller's plea. (No. 47529 R., p.27.) Additionally, the
district court granted Ms. Keller's motion to consolidate the 2013 case and 2019 case for
sentencing. (No. 47526 R., pp.244-45; No. 47529 R., pp.40-41.)
At the combined probation violation disposition and sentencing hearing for both cases,
Ms. Keller recommended the district court retain jurisdiction so she could participate in another
rider. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, L.15 - p.12, L.8.) The State recommended the district court revoke
probation and execute the underlying sentence in the 2013 case, and impose a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed, in the 2019 case. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.5, Ls.4-9.)
In the 2013 case, the district court revoked probation and executed the underlying
sentence. (No. 47526 R., pp.249-52.) In the 2019 case, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to run concurrently with the sentence in the 2013
case. (No. 47529 R., pp.43-46.)
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ISSUES
I.

In the 2013 case, did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Keller's
probation and executed her underlying sentence of seven years, with three years fixed?

II.

In the 2019 case, did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Keller following her plea of guilty
to possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
I.
In The 2013 Case, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Keller's
Probation And Executed Her Underlying Sentence Of Seven Years, With Three Years Fixed
Ms. Keller asserts that, in the 2013 case, the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked her probation and executed her underlying sentence of seven years, with three years
fixed. The district court should have instead followed Ms. Keller's recommendation by retaining
jurisdiction so she could participate in another "rider." (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, L.15 -p.12, L.8.)
A district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under certain
circumstances. LC. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 & 20-222. "A district court's decision to revoke
probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). In reviewing a district court's discretionary

decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry to determine whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion, acted
consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation proceeding.
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. First, the appellate court determines "whether the defendant violated

the terms of his probation." Id. "If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the
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terms of his probation, the second question 1s what should be the consequences of that
violation." Id.
Ms. Keller concedes she admitted to violating her probation. (See No. 47526 R., pp.220,
242-43, 255.) When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no
further inquiry into the question is required. State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, this Court may go to the second step of the analysis and determine whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked Ms. Keller's probation and executed her sentence.
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). As Idaho's

appellate courts have held, "[i]f a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a
district court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106 (quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001)).

Retained jurisdiction is designed "to allow the trial court additional time to evaluate the
defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho
193, 194 (Ct. App. 1984). "Probation is the ultimate objective sought by a defendant who asks a
court to retain jurisdiction." Id. (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982)).
Whether to place a defendant on probation is a choice "committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court." Id. Because probation is at issue, the standard ofreview for a district court decision
on whether to retain jurisdiction is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard, with a focus on the
criteria set forth in LC.§ 19-2521. Id. "Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a 'clear
abuse of discretion' if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate under LC. § 19-2521." Id.
Here, the district court did not have sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate for Ms. Keller. During the combined probation
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violation disposition and sentencing hearing, Ms. Keller's counsel explained that Ms. Keller had
been struggling with heroin addiction off and on for several years. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.6, Ls.1718.) However, during her time on probation, Ms. Keller had been working with her probation
officer, maintaining full-time employment, and working through the Department of Health and
Welfare to get full custody of her son. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.6, Ls.18-21, p.7, Ls.5-9.) Specifically,
Ms. Keller had been working at several restaurants.

(See PSI, pp.319, 322, 329-30.)

Unfortunately, Ms. Keller had relapsed shortly before her latest arrest. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.7,
Ls. I 0-11.) Ms. Keller's counsel emphasized, "What is commendable is that Megan did not try to
hide her use of heroin this time and is ready to take full responsibility." (Tr. 9/26/19, p.11,
Ls.11-13.)
Ms. Keller's counsel additionally informed the district court that Alex O'Neill, the father
of Ms. Keller's son, was in the courtroom for the combined hearing. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.7, L.17
- p.8, L.7.) Mr. O'Neill and Ms. Keller had both previously relapsed around the time she
committed misdemeanor DUI and used a controlled substance without a prescription, and he was
subject to a no contact order prohibiting him from contacting her. 1 (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.7, L.14 p.8, L.16.)

Ms. Keller's counsel requested the district court allow communication between

Ms. Keller and Mr. O'Neill while she was in custody, "so that they can discuss the needs of their
son and also reconnect and gain additional support from him." (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.7, L.20 - p.8,
L.4.) Mr. O'Neill had recently finished a rider, and had employment at the time of the combined
hearing. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.7, Ls.20-22, p.8, Ls.7-11.)
Defense counsel asserted that Mr. O'Neill "could be a good influence on" Ms. Keller
while she was in custody, and the no contact order could be modified to allow contact after she
1

Mr. O'Neill had overdosed on heroin on the day that Ms. Keller was arrested for the
misdemeanor DUI and other charges. (See PSI, pp.167, 169.)
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got out. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.8, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Keller's counsel asserted, "I think this is essential
for her recovery to have a healthy relationship without drug abuse and complete focus on their
child." (Tr. 9/26/19, p.8, Ls.17-19.) Later, defense counsel added, "given that Alex has returned
from a rider program and is clean and sober and highly motivated to stay that way, especially
with a child involved, he is a positive and can be a positive influence on Megan." (Tr. 9/26/19,
p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.2.)
Defense counsel told the district court that Ms. Keller "does have a lot of motivation to
tum things around." (Tr. 9/26/19, p.7, Ls.4-5.) However, "The longer she is in custody, the
longer it will take for her to get into classes and treatment."

(Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, Ls.6-8.)

Ms. Keller's counsel noted that rider program participants as well as inmates serving their
sentences of imprisonment could take the Cincinnati program for substance abuse, but "those
who are sentenced to a period of retained jurisdiction are sent into the rider program as soon as
space is available." (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, Ls.9-17.) In contrast, those serving their sentences
would not be eligible until "about a year out is the soonest from their parole eligible date." (See
Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, Ls.17-20.) Defense counsel thought another rider would serve Ms. Keller well,
"especially now that it's the Cincinnati program, where before it wasn't." (Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, L.24
- p.10, L.2.) Ms. Keller's probation officer in the 2013 case had similarly recommended that
Ms. Keller, if found guilty of the new offenses (in the 2019 case), "be screen[ed] for a second
Retained Jurisdiction." (See R., p.223.)
Ms. Keller's counsel concluded, "It has been a long and trying road for Megan, but she is
progressing and will eventually beat this addiction fully."

(Tr. 9/26/19, p.12, Ls.2-4.)

Ms. Keller was motivated "by her son," and "by not returning to jail or going to prison."
(Tr. 9/26/19, p.12, Ls.4-5.) According to Ms. Keller's counsel, Ms. Keller "just needs to believe
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in herself and stick to the commitment. And the rider program will give her a greater ability to
remain sober." (Tr. 9/26/19, p.12, Ls.6-8.)
In light of the above, the district court did not have sufficient information to determine
that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate for Ms. Keller.

Thus, the

district court abused its discretion when it revoked Ms. Keller's probation and executed her
underlying sentence in the 2013 case.

The district court should have instead followed

Ms. Keller's recommendation by retaining jurisdiction so she could participate in another rider.

II.
In The 2019 Case, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified
Sentence Of Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Keller Following Her Plea Of Guilty
To Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Ms. Keller asserts that, in the 2019 case, the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon her following her plea of
guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The district court should have instead followed
her recommendation by retaining jurisdiction. (See Tr. 9/26/19, p.9, L.15 -p.12, L.8.)
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving "due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Keller does not assert that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Keller must show that in light of the governing criteria,
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the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, "[w ]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...

consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). The
reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement." Id.
Ms. Keller asserts her sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts, because
the district court did not adequately consider the mitigating factors discussed above in Section I
and incorporated herein by reference thereto. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed Ms. Keller's sentence in the 2019 case. The district court should have instead followed
her recommendation by retaining jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Keller respectfully requests that this Court reduce her
sentences in both cases as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 13 th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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